Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role by Masur, Jonathan & Posner, Eric A.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics
2017
Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role
Jonathan Masur
Eric A. Posner
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/law_and_economics
Part of the Law Commons
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics at Chicago Unbound. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and Economics by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more
information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan Masur & Eric Posner, "Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Judicial Role," Coase-Sandor Working Paper Series in Law and
Economics, No. 794 (2017).
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE 
 
 




February 7, 2017 
 
 
Abstract. The two most vilified cases in administrative law are Business 
Roundtable v. SEC and Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA. In Business 
Roundtable, the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC’s proxy access rule 
because the agency’s cost-benefit analysis of the regulation, in the court’s 
view, was defective. In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit struck 
down an EPA regulation of asbestos products on the same grounds. Nearly 
all scholars who have written about these cases have condemned them. We 
argue that the courts acted properly. The regulators’ cost-benefit analyses 
were defective, seriously so; and the courts were right to require the 
agencies to show that their regulations passed an adequate cost-benefit 
analysis. We further argue that the trajectory of law and policy is consistent 
with our view. Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable are 
harbingers rather than errors—harbingers of an era of enhanced judicial 





 Consider the following scenario. A pro-regulatory president serves 
two terms, during which his administration issues a significant number of 
regulations. Most of these regulations are cost-benefit justified, in the sense 
that they produce greater benefits to well-being than costs.1 Then, after 
                                                 
† Masur is John P. Wilson Professor of Law and David and Celia Hilliard Research 
Scholar, University of Chicago Law School. Posner is Kirkland & Ellis Distinguished 
Service Professor and Arthur and Esther Kane Research Chair, University of Chicago Law 
School. Thanks to Daniel Hemel and Cass Sunstein for helpful comments, to the Russell 
Baker Scholars Fund and the David & Celia Hilliard Fund for research support, and to Mei 
Ying Barnes, Hanan Cidor, Kathrine Gutierrez, Christina McClintock, Holly Newell, and 
Michael Wheat for excellent research assistance. 
1 During the eight years of the Obama Administration, the regulations promulgated by 
administrative agencies produced benefits in excess of costs. Shaun Donovan, Exit Memo: 
Office of Management and Budget, The White House Archives (Jan. 5, 2017), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/administration/cabinet/exit-memos/office-
management-and-budget; see also Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified 
Benefits and the Problem of Regulation under Uncertainty, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 87 
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eight years, a new anti-regulatory president2 assumes office and vows to 
dismantle many of his predecessor’s regulations, beginning with regulation 
meant to curb the emission of greenhouse gases.3 A president who wishes to 
deregulate must promulgate a new regulation that repeals the existing one, 
just as Congress must pass a new statute to repeal an existing statute. So the 
president issues a regulation canceling the greenhouse gas rule. But this 
new deregulatory regulation is not cost-benefit justified. It repeals an earlier 
regulation that produced more benefits than costs, and thus itself generates 
costs in excess of benefits.4 If the new regulation is challenged, how should 
a court respond? Should it permit a regulation—here, a regulation that 
dismantles earlier regulations—that would do more harm than good?  
 This scenario is of course not hypothetical. But the problem is 
general and spans the entirety of the regulatory state. When courts are asked 
to review regulations issued by government agencies, how closely should 
they scrutinize the agency’s reasons for regulating? At one extreme, courts 
could examine the regulations de novo, in effect delegating to the agency 
the task of collecting evidence and providing an initial assessment, but then 
replacing the agency’s judgment with their own. Call this level of review 
“high.” At the other extreme, courts could rubberstamp any regulation as 
long as the agency provides reasons for it that are prima facie plausible, or 
even no reasons at all—call this level of review “low.” High and low are 
ends of a spectrum: one could endorse any intermediate level as well. The 
courts have struggled to articulate the proper level, leading scholars to 
suspect that they do not review regulations in a consistent way.5 Scholars 
themselves offer a multitude of interpretations, often unhelpful restatements 
                                                                                                                            
(2016) (finding that most regulations produced benefits in excess of costs, even when they 
failed to fully quantify those benefits). 
2 Presidential Executive Order on Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs, 
January 30, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/01/30/presidential-
executive-order-reducing-regulation-and-controlling (ordering that two regulations be 
repealed for every new regulation that is promulgated). 
3 Kyle Feldscher, Trump Would Repeal Clean Power Plan, Other Big EPA Regs, WASH. 
EXAMINER, September 15, 2016, http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/trump-would-
repeal-clean-power-plan-other-big-epa-regs/article/2601931. 
4 See EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Clean Power Plan Final Rule (2015), 
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cpp-final-rule-ria.pdf 
(analyzing the Clean Power Plan and finding that it produces significantly greater benefits 
than costs). 
5 See Kevin M. Stack, Interpreting Regulations, 111 MICH. L. REV. 355, 360 (2012) 
(stating that when interpreting regulations “[c]ourts not only lack a consistent approach, but 
also generally invoke one interpretative tool or another without stating reasons for doing 
so”); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 761 (2008) (providing evidence that Supreme Court justices apply the 
arbitrary and capricious standard in a way that reflects their ideological biases). 
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of the “arbitrary and capricious” standard in the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA) using different but equally ambiguous words.6 More than 70 
years after the APA placed the question of judicial review at the center of 
administrative law, no one agrees how it should operate. 
 Scholars do agree on one thing: that the courts went too far in two 
notorious cases—Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA7 and Business 
Roundtable v. SEC.8 The interesting thing about these cases is that they both 
involved cost-benefit analysis (CBA), a decision procedure that most 
agencies use to evaluate major regulations but that rarely provides the basis 
for rigorous judicial scrutiny. The EPA used a CBA to justify regulations 
that limited the use of asbestos products, while the SEC used a CBA to 
justify a regulation that required corporations to place certain shareholder 
nominees to board positions on proxy ballots. The courts struck down both 
regulations because the CBAs were, in the courts’ view, defective. Almost 
all scholars who have written about these cases agree that the courts acted 
wrongly by requiring the agencies to justify their regulations with valid 
CBAs.9 
 In this Essay, we seek to refute this conventional wisdom, and also 
to shed light on the controversy over levels of review. We argue that both 
cases were correctly decided. The CBAs really were inadequate, and the 
courts were right to strike down the regulations. Our larger point concerns 
the relationship between judicial review of regulations and quantitative 
methods of evaluating policy, of which CBA is the leading (but not only) 
example.10 We argue that when quantitative methods are appropriate for 
evaluating regulations, a “high” level of judicial review is justified. 
 To understand why, we begin with the basic tradeoff involved in 
judicial review of regulations, which has been repeated ad infinitum in the 
literature but is accurate as far as it goes.11 The major difference between 
                                                 
6 See R. George Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea in Administrative 
Law Can’t be Defined, and What This Means for Law in General, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 
851 (2010). 
7 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
8 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
9 See infra Part II. 
10 There are other quantitative methods, including reliance on subjective well-being 
surveys. See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being 
Analysis v. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J.1603 (2013). In principle, feasibility 
analysis could be quantified though it never is. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, 
Against Feasibility Analysis, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 657 (2010) (describing examples of 
feasibility analysis and the lack of quantification). 
11 For a lucid recent statement, see Cass Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness 
Review (Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 16-12 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2752068; see also ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION (2016). 
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judges and agency officials is that judges are generalists and agency 
officials are experts. Because experts know more about their field than 
generalists do, generalists should defer to the judgment of experts, all else 
equal. This is the major argument for a low level of review. But all else is 
not equal. Agency officials may make mistakes and, more important, they 
may be biased—consciously or unconsciously—and their biases may 
influence how they evaluate regulations. Their biases could be ideological, 
of course; but they could also reflect other inclinations—for example, to act 
rather than to remain passive under public pressure;12 or to advance the 
partisan interests of political masters such as the president or members of 
Congress.13 High-level judicial review is most clearly justified when 
agencies are biased. 
 To be sure, bias is complicated, and judges can be biased too.14 But 
the posture of the debate is one of offering advice to the judiciary, which 
assumes that the judiciary is unbiased enough to accept this advice in good 
faith. (If not, claims on both sides of the argument are idle.) There is also 
reason to think that the federal judiciary on the whole is less biased than 
agency leaders—just because the federal judiciary is normally bipartisan 
while agency leadership is rarely so, and judges cannot be fired while 
agency leaders can be. That said, the relative level of bias and open-
mindedness as between judiciary and bureaucracy is an empirical question, 
and no doubt different intuitions about the empirics help explain why 
scholars disagree about the proper level of review. Nonetheless, the 
expertise-neutrality tradeoff remains a useful device for exploring 
arguments about judicial review, and we employ it here. 
 Our major claim is that quantification—reflected in CBA and other 
methods—changes the terms of the debate. The unique feature of 
quantification is that it facilitates review. When regulators eschew 
quantification in their explanations for regulations, they typically put forth 
boilerplate that is difficult to evaluate. It is tempting, for example, for a 
regulator to say that a pollution regulation is justified because pollution 
causes harm, and less harm is good. Such a justification can be applied to 
any regulation, so if it were accepted by courts, regulators would be 
immunized from review as long as they satisfy procedural requirements and 
avoid making any provably false statements of fact. If regulators are biased 
                                                 
12 See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON 76-81 (2002). 
13 Matthew Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 53 (2008) (describing how the executive branch and Congress can attempt to control 
the bureaucracy); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 
(2001) (describing how the executive uses federal regulation to accomplish objectives that 
are blocked by Congress).  
14 For evidence, see Miles & Sunstein, supra note 5, at 782 (providing evidence that judges 
decide administrative law cases at least partially in line with their political preferences). 
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or sometimes biased, they would be free to regulate in a biased fashioned 
rather than for the public good. Courts would be unable to stop them. 
 By contrast, quantification forces regulators to put their decision-
making into a format that can be evaluated by generalist superiors. This 
process is hardly unfamiliar: it is the way that (for example) the heads of 
corporations evaluate the work of their subordinates. A CEO must contend 
with the claims of the division heads who seek approval for their projects. 
The CEO is a generalist; the division heads are specialists. Rather than 
throw up their hands and approve any project that a division head proposes 
as long as the division head gives “reasons,” CEOs demand that the reasons 
take a particular quantified form. The division head must perform a net 
present value (NPV) analysis, which is an estimate of the benefits and costs 
of the project for the firm. As in the case of agency regulations, some 
benefits and costs are easier to quantify than others. Money pouring in from 
future sales can be easily quantified, but the effect of a project on the brand 
and legal risk are often conjectural. 
Imagine that the division head of a pharmaceutical company 
proposes a drug that may produce side effects that give rise to litigation and 
harm the reputation of the company as a whole. The division head will need 
to use judgment to evaluate these complex risks, but in the end the risks will 
be quantified and folded into an overall NPV analysis of the project that 
acknowledges the uncertainty of certain estimates but relies on them 
nonetheless. The value of this exercise—even when certain predictions are 
not much better than guesswork—is that it isolates the risks, allowing for 
careful consideration of them, and that it preserves the predictions for later 
review, allowing executives to learn from past mistakes and to evaluate the 
predictive abilities of their staffs. With the NPV in hand, the CEO can 
approve or disapprove the project based on firm-wide considerations that 
the division head may be unaware of or inclined to ignore. 
 Quantification occurs in many other contexts as well. Firms are 
required to follow accounting rules, which help shareholders, creditors, 
governments, and other interested parties to evaluate the business. The 
grading of students is another form of quantification that facilitates 
evaluation by hiring committees; so is the evaluation of teachers with 
ratings systems. Cars, books, kitchen utensils, and other consumer goods 
are given quantified ratings. Universities are ranked; borrowers are assigned 
credit scores; banks are given CAMELS ratings. Quantified evaluation is 
ubiquitous because quantification enables generalists—frequently superiors, 
but also consumers—to evaluate the claims of specialists. Given the 
ubiquity of quantified evaluation in daily life, the claim that government 
regulations and projects cannot be subject to similar forms of quantified 
evaluation is bizarre. 
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 Courts should ensure that regulatory agencies perform the quantified 
evaluation of their regulations adequately, just as they do when they 
evaluate the accounting statements of businesses accused of fraud and 
citizens accused of failing to pay taxes. But what does “adequate” mean? 
This is a tricky question, and we suspect there is no general answer to it. 
Courts should insist that regulators quantify benefits and costs, but courts 
should also take seriously arguments that certain estimates require judgment 
calls that the regulator is in the better position to make than a court is. In 
some cases, the regulator must reconcile conflicting academic studies, and a 
court may properly conclude that the regulator’s judgment is reasonable 
even if the court does not share it. In other cases, quantification may be 
impossible or pointless, as we discuss below. But the key thing to 
understand is that at the current moment in the development of the 
regulatory state, cost-benefit analyses tend to be low quality rather than 
high quality, suggesting that greater judicial involvement will cause more 
good than harm.15 At some future time, this may no longer be true, but we 
are a long way from that happy condition. 
 Critics of judicial CBA mandates of the sort introduced in Corrosion 
Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable argue that courts are not qualified 
to evaluate the expert determinations of agencies.16 They draw on an old 
distinction between procedure and substance. Courts are capable of forcing 
regulators to comply with procedural rules—notice requirements, for 
example. But they are in a weak position to second-guess substantive 
determinations like valuations. However, CBA is foremost a decision 
procedure.17 If courts can review agencies for procedural violations, then it 
can review agencies for their compliance with the rules of CBA. The genius 
of CBA, in common with other quantitative decision procedures, is that it 
cabins the decision-maker’s discretion by forcing it to comply with certain 
rules. The courts in Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable 
correctly pointed out that the regulators violated the rules of CBA. There 
does remain a residuum of substantive discretion that the rules of CBA do 
not eliminate. With respect to these substantive judgments, courts do need 
tread carefully, for all the conventional reasons, which we discuss below. 
 We start in Part I with a brief reprisal of the normative case for CBA 
and then argue that judges are as capable of evaluating CBAs as they are of 
evaluating any other decision or action that comes before them. In Part II 
                                                 
15 See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Unquantified Benefits and the Problem of 
Regulation Under Uncertainty, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 87, 90-92 (2016) (criticizing the 
quality of current CBAs and their failure to fully account for benefits and costs). 
16 See infra Part II.A. 




we discuss Corrosion-Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable. We argue 
that the agencies performed CBA badly and the courts properly struck down 
the regulations. Part III turns to the law. We argue that that there is a strong 
legal trajectory in favor of CBA, reflected in judicial decisions, executive 
orders, and even the regulators’ independent judgments. This trajectory is 
bipartisan or even nonpartisan, a long overdue form of bureaucratic 
rationalization that addresses the question of what agencies should attempt 
to accomplish when they regulate. The answer that has emerged over 
decades of debate and reform is: produce benefits that exceed costs. 
 While many scholars have claimed that CBA is ideologically biased 
toward anti-regulatory outcomes, we show that this claim is mistaken. This 
point is of particular importance at the current time as we move from a 
presidential administration that was friendly to regulation to one that has 
committed itself to deregulation. In order to deregulate, agencies must 
formally issue new regulations that eliminate or relax earlier regulations. If 
they are required to conduct a CBA, then the CBA will need to show that 
the benefits from deregulation exceed the costs. If the agency fails to take 
this step, or if the CBA is inadequate, a reviewing court should strike down 
the deregulation and leave the existing regulation in place. CBA is not a 
one-way ticket to the night watchman state. 
 
I.  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
A. A Primer on CBA 
 
 CBA is a decision-procedure whose normative basis is what 
Matthew Adler and one of us has called weak welfarism.18 Welfarism is the 
principle that the well-being of people is morally important. The word 
“weak” in “weak welfarism” acknowledges that other considerations, such 
as deontological principles, also may have moral importance. But while 
agencies might take account of those principles when deciding whether to 
regulate, they are not accounted for in a CBA. Thus, CBA does not commit 
an agency to utilitarianism or other strong welfarist philosophy, but, 
because it does not address deontological constraints, its scope will be 
determined by the type of behavior that the government regulates.19 
                                                 
18 Id. The other one of us subscribes to this normative foundation for CBA as well. See 
John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis v. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 1603 (2013). 
19 We will not discuss here whether agencies should take account of moral considerations 
other than those embodied in the CBA. Our view is that agencies should very rarely do so, 
but in some circumstances it may be appropriate. 
8 
 
 Not everyone believes that the government should advance social 
welfare.20 But most people do, and this premise is unquestioned in debates 
about how regulatory agencies should behave.21 The trickier question is 
how to define and measure welfare. Most economists believe that welfare 
increases whenever people are better able to satisfy their preferences, as 
measured by willingness-to-pay. Most philosophers reject this view, as do 
we. People’s preferences, especially when ill-informed or distorted by 
social influences, do not necessarily reflect their welfare; and the reliance 
on the money metric introduces further distortions because of the 
diminishing marginal utility of money.22 However, CBA, based on 
willingness-to-pay, will typically approximate welfare for a range of 
plausible definitions, to a greater degree than competing approaches such as 
feasibility analysis.23 This is the justification for using CBA as a decision 
procedure. The analogy to net present value is useful here: no one thinks 
that a NPV calculation settles the question whether a commercial project is 
wise. A decision procedure like CBA and NPV formalizes the process of 
decision-making so as to maximize the probability that a correct decision 
will be made. It does so by helping agents remember to consider all relevant 
factors, and, by requiring a common metric, facilitating comparison of those 
factors. 
 Regulatory statutes direct agencies to advance the public good in 
their area of expertise—the environment, health and safety, financial 
regulation, and so on. While statutes usually do not explicitly direct 
regulators to use CBA, they almost always direct regulators to consider the 
costs as well as the benefits of a regulation, as we describe in more detail 
below. Because CBA is the most natural way to consider costs and benefits, 
the White House has directed regulators to use CBA.24 
 Many commentators have criticized CBA. The criticisms in the law 
and policy literature reach back to the 1980s.25 The criticisms in the welfare 
economics literature reach back even farther.26 None of these criticisms has 
carried the day. CBA is more entrenched in government than ever. 
 We will not rehearse all the criticisms and responses here. We 
discuss just two of the criticisms pertinent to the current discussion. The 
first criticism is that for many, possibly most regulations, the costs and 
                                                 
20 See, e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, UTOPIA (1974). 
21 See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis & Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 7-9. 
22 For a discussion, see ADLER & POSNER, supra note 14. 
23 Masur & Posner, Against Feasibility Analysis, supra note 11, at 672-73. 
24 See Exec. Order No. 13563, 3 C.F.R. 13563 (2012). 




(especially) benefits are largely guesswork.27 Quantification is arbitrary and 
adds nothing to the decision-making process. The SEC’s proxy access rule, 
for example, might reduce the cost of capital by subjecting corporate 
management to outside discipline, or it might not affect the cost of capital at 
all—because the dissident nominee will nearly always lose the election, or 
corporate managers will formulate new ways to minimize the influence of 
shareholders.28 The benefits are unknowable. In the case of the asbestos 
rule, we do not know whether the reduction in the availability of asbestos 
products will save lives or be offset by the use of more dangerous substitute 
materials.29 Regulators should not be required to quantify benefits when the 
benefits are unknowable; this is an arbitrary exercise. 
 Our view is that if regulators cannot determine whether a regulation 
will generate net benefits, then they should usually not issue the regulation. 
But there may be close cases where the regulator, based on hard-to-
articulate staff expertise,30 reasonably believes that the benefits are positive 
but cannot settle on a precise estimate because of the absence of hard data 
and of the high cost of obtaining additional evidence through surveys and 
other methods. In that case, the regulator should go ahead and regulate but 
also be required to publish an estimate so that its claim to tacit expertise can 
be evaluated retrospectively, along with an explanation as to why an 
estimate cannot be derived from empirical evidence.31 The D.C. Circuit 
took just this view, complaining that the SEC “failed adequately to quantify 
the [sic] certain costs or to explain why those costs could not be 
quantified,”32 implying that the regulation might have passed muster if the 
                                                 
27 See FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF 
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2005); see also John C. Coates, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 
(2015), who advocates “nonquantified” CBA. We think it is best to avoid confusion by not 
referring to Coates’ approach as a style of CBA, which in its essence requires 
quantification. ADLER & POSNER, supra note 8, called this approach “intuitive balancing.” 
28 See infra Part II.B. 
29 See infra Part II.A. 
30 See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1355, 1396 (2016). 
31 See Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15 (arguing that agencies should 
be required to estimate costs and benefits and justify those estimates). We find ourselves in 
agreement with the otherwise critical account of Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 
1401, who argue that agencies cannot credibly appeal to tacit knowledge to rationalize bad 
regulations in the long term: “the pretext problem is self-limiting, because agencies that 
constantly base their decisions on (putatively) nontransmissible tacit expertise will 
encounter increasing skepticism from reviewing courts over time.” However, this argument 
does not support their thesis: if judges were required to approve regulations based on non-
quantitative balancing of benefits and costs, as they argue, then agencies would never need 
to appeal to tacit knowledge in the first place. 
32 Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1149. 
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SEC could make the case that quantification was impossible or 
inappropriate. In our view, once the regulator goes on record with its 
estimate of hard-to-quantify benefits, and adds them to the empirically 
verified benefits and costs, the regulator may issue the regulation if the 
aggregate benefits, including the estimates in question, exceed the costs. 
 The second criticism is that CBA is a politically biased decision 
procedure—and biased in favor of ideologically conservative outcomes.33 
This view is partly based on CBA’s association with the Reagan 
administration. Ronald Reagan campaigned for office promising 
deregulation, and one of his first acts was to sign an executive order that 
requires regulators to conduct CBA. Pro-regulation forces argued that the 
CBA requirement was intended as a bureaucratic hurdle that would delay or 
block needed regulations.34 But CBA is foremost a tool of good government 
and falls into a long tradition of using quantitative methods to persuade the 
government and public to accept progressive change.35 The rejection of 
quantitative methods—and of science and statistics—is more closely 
associated with the right (as well as the extreme left), as a matter of history. 
Whatever the intentions of Reagan administration officials, the effect of the 
CBA requirement, if conscientiously carried through, need not be any more 
ideological than a requirement that the government budget office follow the 
rules of accounting. 
 One version of the criticism is that because CBA discounts 
unquantified (or unquantifiable) benefits, it must lead to under-regulation, 
which is an outcome favored by conservatives.36 This view seriously 
misunderstands CBA. One source of error is the tendency to confuse the 
                                                 
33 This argument has been made for decades, but for a recent version, see Gregory C. 
Keating, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis the Only Game in Town? (2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2880697. Keating claims 
that cost-benefit analysis is conservative because CBA is welfarist and conservatives are 
welfarist, while liberals are deontologists who reject welfarism. There are many problems 
with this view, but to take just one example: welfarists going back to Bentham usually 
endorse radical redistribution of wealth because of the declining utility of the dollar. 
Deontologists sometimes do, but many—such as philosophical libertarians like Nozick—
do not. 
34 The major exceptions are STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982) and 
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE (2002). 
35 See William Davies, How Statistics Lost Their Power – and Why We Should Fear What 
Comes Next, The Guardian (January 19, 2017), 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/19/crisis-of-statistics-big-data-democracy; 
RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY: HOW COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH (2008).  
36 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27; David M. Driesen, Douglas A. Kysar & 
Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit Analysis: New Foundations on Shifting Sand, 3 Reg. & 
Governance 48 (2009). 
11 
 
“market” and the status quo. If the status quo is an unregulated market, and 
regulation must pass a CBA, then the CBA requirement might slow down 
regulation relative to a procedure that allows regulators to disregard 
evidence that does not support regulation. But the status quo almost always 
involves a regulated market; CBA can slow down deregulation (which is 
actually a form of regulation that strips away restrictions on market 
behavior) as well as regulation because CBA requires deregulation to be 
based on quantified evidence as well. Moreover, if the argument were taken 
seriously, it would suggest that any type of government decision-making 
that rested on analysis and evidence is inherently conservative in an 
ideological sense. Such an argument would sweep in procedural 
requirements such as those in the APA, and indeed the normal rules for 
legislation of all kinds. 
 Another source of error is the view that real but difficult-to-quantify 
benefits are benefits that liberals value more than conservatives, as a result 
of which CBA is biased toward conservative outcomes. For example, liberal 
critics of CBA have complained that CBA disregards many of the hard-to-
value benefits of environmental regulation.37 When a regulator performs a 
CBA of an environmental regulation, it can easily gather data about costs 
from industry, while it can only with difficulty place valuations on the 
health and recreation benefits of a cleaner environment. If regulators must 
comply with CBA, then they will produce environmental regulations that 
are weaker than optimal, according to these critics. 
 There are serious problems with this argument. First, the premise of 
the argument—that measurement problems tend to result in weak regulation 
because benefits are harder to measure than costs—is incorrect. 
Retrospective reviews of regulations show that CBA typically undercounts 
both costs and benefits in roughly equal measure.38 Even if it is more 
difficult for regulators to quantify benefits than costs, the remedy is for 
regulators to invest additional resources in quantifying benefits. If 
regulators have undercounted benefits in the past, that is a failing of those 
regulators, not a general problem with CBA. If a regulator cannot quantify a 
particular benefit or cost with precision, the regulator should offer its best 
estimate.39 
                                                 
37 ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 27 (arguing that CBA does not account well for 
non-market goods such as health or environmental harms); Driesen et al., supra note 36 
(same). 
38 See, e.g., United States Government Accountability Office, Reexamining Regulations: 
Opportunities Exist to Improve Effectiveness and Transparency of Retrospective Reviews 
(2007) (surveying and summarizing approximately 1300 retrospective reviews conducted 
by multiple agencies). 
39 Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15, at 832. 
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In addition, the mandate to avoid doubtful valuations is just a 
standard of proof: it applies with equal force to the claims made by pro-
regulation and anti-regulation forces. Business interests, for example, often 
complain that regulations generate economic uncertainty that interferes with 
planning and thus increases costs. In recent years, they have made this 
argument about regulations issued under the Affordable Care Act and the 
Dodd-Frank Act.40 The argument is not crazy; maybe it is even true. And if 
it is true, then a CBA of a regulation should take account of the uncertainty 
costs that it creates in addition to the costs of compliance. But regulators 
have refused to take account of uncertainty costs of this sort, no doubt 
because the evidence of such costs remains slim.41 
Another mistake is the assumption that regulation always advances 
the interests of liberals. Consider President Trump’s plan to build a wall 
along the Mexican border in order to block illegal entry into the United 
States. Trump’s major argument is that the wall would reduce crime and 
terrorism. However, the evidence that the wall would have any effect on 
crime or terrorism is nil. If the Department of Homeland Security were 
required to perform a CBA before building the wall,42 it would be required 
to concede that the evidence indicates that illegal immigrants commit 
crimes at about the same rate as U.S. citizens, which is very little. Because 
the wall itself would cost billions of dollars while generating trivial benefits 
in terms of crime reduction, it would fail a CBA. We suspect that similar 
types of analysis would indicate that many harsh forms of law enforcement 
are not cost-justified.43 
As a final example, consider the case of capital regulations, which 
limit the amount of debt that banks can use to fund their investments and 
loans.44 Nearly everyone agrees that capital regulations make sense; the 
ideological divide concerns how high they should be. When capital 
regulations were very low, CBA would have required that they be 
increased—a “liberal” outcome. Now that they are much higher, it is 
                                                 
40 Carter Wood, Dodd-Frank, Whence Uncertainty Springs, THE BRT BLOG (2012), 
http://businessroundtable.org/media/blog/dodd-frank-whence-uncertainty-springs. 
41 Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, & Steven J. Davis, Measuring Economic Policy 
Uncertainty, 131 Q. J. ECON. 1593 (2016); Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, & Steven J. 
Davis, Has Economic Policy Uncertainty Hampered the Economy? (Becker Friedman 
Institute for Research in Economics Working Paper No. 2012-003, February 2012).  
42 As it would likely be required to do if Trump relied on the Secure Fence Act of 2006 
rather than a new statute, as suggested by news reports. See Daniel Hemel, Jonathan 
Masur, & Eric Posner, How Antonin Scalia’s Ghost Could Block Donald Trump’s Wall, 
NY TIMES, Jan. 25, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/25/opinion/how-antonin-
scalias-ghost-could-block-donald-trumps-wall.html?_r=0. 
43 Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323 (2004). 
44 See Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy 
Requirements?, 82 U. CHICAGO L. REV. 1853 (2015). 
13 
 
possible that CBA could require that they be reduced—a “conservative” 
outcome. The apparent ideological valence of CBA is an illusion generated 
by the location of the status quo regulation in ideological space; CBA does 
not itself have an inherent ideological valence. 
 
B.  Are Judges Capable of Evaluating CBAs? 
 
 It is possible to hold the view that regulators should conduct CBAs 
but that when judges review regulations, they should not evaluate the 
regulation on the basis of the quality of the CBA. It would be left for the 
White House or Congress to discipline regulators who issue regulations that 
fail CBAs. The argument is based on traditional notions of judicial review: 
judges, as generalists, are in a weak position to evaluate the work of 
experts.45 We see this argument in many different contexts: for example, the 
business judgment rule and notions that judges should defer to legislative 
fact-finding or executive-branch judgments in the field of foreign relations. 
 While we sympathize with this view,46 the argument overlooks the 
ways that CBA facilitates judicial review. Judicial review of CBA can be 
divided into two components, one procedural and the other substantive. In 
reviewing procedure, the court verifies that the regulator has quantified all 
the costs and benefits of the regulation and translated them into comparable 
units (dollars), and that the quantified benefits exceed the quantified costs. 
If the regulator fails to quantify any benefits, then the regulation cannot be 
approved on the basis of those alleged benefits, though it may be approved 
if the quantified benefits exceed the quantified costs. Judicial review is an 
accounting procedure that any judge can undertake. It is no harder than 
verifying that the deadlines for notice-and-comment rulemaking have been 
obeyed. 
 The SEC in Business Roundtable and the EPA in Corrosion Proof 
Fittings both failed to comply with the procedural elements of CBA: they 
both failed to report estimates of the monetary benefits and the overall cost-
benefit comparison. Many other regulators routinely fail to quantify costs 
and benefits in the full and rigorous way that is required by CBA.47 Even if 
courts were to enforce only the procedural requirements of CBA, they 
would improve the performance of agencies. 
                                                 
45 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 30; see also Sunstein, supra note 11, at 8-10, 17 
(suggesting that courts should play a minimal role in reviewing cost-benefit analysis, rather 
than zero role).  
46 One of us once (tentatively) held this view. See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-
Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 
246, 247 (2015) (mea culpa). 
47 Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15. 
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 But enforcement of CBA procedure may not be sufficient. 
Regulators may be tempted to comply formally with the rules but invent 
valuations or put insufficient effort into calculating valuations. To review 
valuations on substantive grounds, courts will need to second-guess 
judgments that lie at the heart of the agencies’ expertise. But while 
substantive review may often be challenging, it need not be. Regulators 
often make easily identifiable substantive errors, including: using 
inconsistent numbers for the same cost or benefit;48 failing to consider the 
tradeoffs that regulation would require, including the cost of substitutes, as 
the EPA did in banning asbestos;49 failing to discount over time or 
discounting inconsistently (for example, discounting costs but not 
benefits);50 and failing to cite or discuss relevant peer-reviewed studies.51 If 
courts did no more than demand that agencies comply with these basic 
forms of good practice, CBAs would be considerably better than they have 
been.52 
 But there are also harder cases. What should courts do when the 
regulator cites conflicting studies and concludes that one study is more 
plausible than the other, as in the case of the proxy access rule?53 We think 
that regulators should not regulate when the empirical evidence for 
regulation is thin, but can imagine situations where courts should defer to 
the regulator’s judgment on the quality of academic studies because of the 
complexity of the issues involved. As is so frequently the case in litigation, 
the right answer will depend on the circumstances. But courts deal with 
expert studies in private litigation all the time.54 Because both sides 
typically submit expert reports with different conclusions, the court must 
evaluate both of them, even though the reports may involve statistical, 
                                                 
48 See EPA, Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in 
Commerce Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,461-62 (1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 
763). 
49 See id. 
50 See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218 (discussing EPA inconsistencies in 
discounting). 
51 See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired 
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of Performance for Fossil-Fuel-
Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-Commercial-Institutional, and Small Industrial-
Commercial-Institutional Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304, 9304 (Feb. 16, 
2012) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63). (EPA Mercury Rule). 
52 See Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15. Sunstein offers a more 
limited list of errors that should lead a court to overturn a regulation, nearly all of which 
involve errors more egregious than the ones we describe above. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 10, at 17. 
53 See infra Part II.B. 
54 Kelli M. Hinson et al., Civil Evidence, 59 SMU L. Rev. 965, 965 (2006) (“This survey 
period found the courts reviewing expert cases more than any other topic.”). 
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scientific, and other technical reasoning. It cannot “defer” to two 
inconsistent reports. In the case of judicial review of agency regulation, 
courts should draw on the same skills that they use in private litigation. 
 In a recent paper, Gersen and Vermeule criticize strict judicial 
review of agency action. Although their major point is that “rationality 
review” does not imply searching inquiry of agency rulemaking, many of 
their criticisms apply to judicial review of CBA as well, as they note.55 
Among other things, they point out that regulators often legitimately rely on 
“tacit knowledge” that they cannot document for the benefit of courts;56 that 
regulators must make tradeoffs between speed and accuracy that cannot be 
quantified;57 that they face subtle questions about how to value risk;58 and, 
most of all, that regulators must make decisions in the face of extreme 
uncertainty where the risks cannot be reliably quantified.59 
 While all these problems create challenges for regulators and courts, 
they are not insurmountable. The tacit knowledge problem is just a 
restatement of the problem of valuation: often valuations are difficult to 
determine. As we have argued, that problem is best addressed 
institutionally, with a requirement that agencies go on record with estimates 
and then evaluate the accuracy of those estimates at a future time.60 We 
agree that agencies that face deadlines or have good reason to act quickly 
may need to be excused from a CBA requirement. There is a subtle question 
as to how much time an agency should spend gathering information before 
it conducts a CBA, one that can be answered only with common sense and 
in light of experience, and here again judicial review should be deferential. 
But this is more a problem of theory than of practice. We doubt that CEOs 
are flummoxed when subordinates turn over sloppy NPVs and plead the 
pressure of time. 
 Risks can usually be quantified and valued. Where they cannot be, 
the problem is not for judicial review but for regulation itself. When 
uncertainty makes it impossible to know whether a regulation will improve 
welfare, the agency should not regulate. As we have argued elsewhere, 
when regulators believe that they have strong reasons to value regulatory 
benefits but lack statistical evidence that permits for a valuation, they 
should make estimates and provide for retrospective review at a future date, 
when the uncertainty has been resolved.61  
                                                 
55 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 30, at 1370-71. 
56 Id. at 1396. 
57 Id. at 1394-95. 
58 Id. at 1387-88. 
59 Id. at 1359. 
60 Masur & Posner, Unquantified Benefits, supra note 15, at 132. 
61 Most such examples are straightforward: for example, a pollutant is known to produce 
headaches in the exposed population but the regulator does not how to value a headache. 
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The ability of courts to review the substantive determinations of 
agencies is in the end an empirical question. Little can be said now about 
this question because courts have so rarely reviewed the CBAs of agencies. 
That has not stopped critics of CBA from pointing to Corrosion Proof 
Fittings and Business Roundtable as evidence that courts are incapable of 
reviewing the substance of CBAs. In the next Part, we evaluate their 
argument.  
 
II.  REGULATION AND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THE COURTS 
 
 If there is an “anti-canon” in administrative law,62 it includes 
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA and Business Roundtable v. SEC. Those 
cases are regularly held up as examples of judicial review run amok—of 
courts substituting their (less informed) judgments for those of the expert 
agencies they were reviewing, with disastrous consequences. According to 
this line of thinking, forcing agencies to conduct cost-benefit analyses, and 
allowing courts to review those cost-benefit analyses and reject them if they 
are inadequate, is sure to lead to rampant invalidations of regulations that 
should be allowed to stand. The academic consensus against Corrosion 
Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable is nearly complete. 
 But the critics do not come to grips with a significant fact about the 
cases: the cost-benefit analyses that supported the EPA and SEC regulations 
at issue in those two cases were defective. The agencies failed to quantify 
important costs and benefits, and where they did, their analyses suggested 
that at least parts of the regulations were producing more costs than 
benefits. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit in Corrosion Proof Fittings and the 
D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable proved themselves capable of 
evaluating the agencies’ CBAs and pinpointing their errors. The judicial 
opinions are not perfect, but the agencies’ work was far from perfect as 
well, as the courts aptly demonstrated. The two cases are examples of 
cogent judicial reasoning in the face of agency error. 
 
                                                                                                                            
There are standard methods for making reasonable estimates in such circumstances. In 
other cases, the exposed population is not known, and without an expensive 
epidemiological studies can only be guessed at. In both cases, the agency should be 
allowed to make estimates subject to a subsequent review. See id. 
62 Cf. Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011). 
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A.  Corrosion Proof Fittings 
 
 1.  The Regulation, the Court Decision, and the Academic Response 
 
In 1989, the EPA promulgated a rule under the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (TSCA) that banned the manufacture, importation, and sale of 
nearly every product containing asbestos—twenty-seven products in all.63 
TSCA gives the EPA the authority to regulate any chemical substance that 
presents an “unreasonable risk” to health or the environment, and it directed 
the agency to select the “least burdensome requirements” that would 
alleviate the risk.64 By the time the EPA set out to regulate asbestos, it had 
accumulated evidence to indicate that it was a “highly potent carcinogen” 
and could cause other diseases as well, including mesothelioma (sometimes 
referred to as “black lung disease”).65 The EPA imposed a near-complete 
ban on asbestos, believing that there were no acceptably safe uses, rather 
than banning its use in particular products, imposing labeling requirements, 
or opting for some other less stringent regulatory response. 
Two years later, in Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA,66 the Fifth 
Circuit struck down the EPA’s asbestos regulation. It  held that the agency 
had failed to demonstrate that this was the least burdensome means of 
regulating the health hazards posed by asbestos. The court performed a 
detailed examination of the EPA’s CBA and concluded that the agency had 
made numerous errors in selecting its level of regulation. These included 
banning products when costs were likely to exceed benefits and failing to 
account for risk-risk tradeoffs. Rather than reconsider and re-promulgate the 
regulation after the Fifth Circuit’s decision, the EPA largely abandoned its 
attempts to regulate asbestos under TSCA and relied instead on a 
constellation of other statutes (and other agencies). 
The scholarly response to the Fifth Circuit opinion was scathing and 
uniformly negative, and it has remained so in the 25 years since the case 
was decided. Shortly after it was handed down, one commentator described 
Corrosion-Proof Fittings as a “tragedy;”67 nearly twenty years later it was 
still being characterized as a “bête noire” of environmentalists.68 In 
between, academic commentary regarding the decision has remained 
                                                 
63 EPA, Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce 
Prohibitions, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,461-62 (1989) (codified at 40 C.F.R. Pt. 763). 
64 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2016). 
65 EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,467. 
66 947 F.2d 1201 (1991). 
67 Linda Stadler, Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA: Asbestos in the Fifth Circuit--A Battle of 
Unreasonableness, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 423, 433 (1993). 
68 Daniel A. Farber, Rethinking the Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1355, 
1380 (2009) (referring to Corrosion-Proof Fittings as a “bete noire” of environmentalists). 
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negative, even from scholars who otherwise tend to support CBA.69 Most of 
the criticism has centered around the argument that the court substituted its 
own views regarding environmental regulation for the (more expert) EPA’s 
in contravention of the proper role of courts in administrative review.70 
 Scholars have been wrong to treat Corrosion Proof Fittings as an 
administrative law bugbear. The Corrosion Proof Fittings court wasn’t 
perfect, but it got more right than it got wrong, and it exposed serious flaws 
in the EPA’s CBA. Corrosion Proof Fittings should be celebrated as a high 
water mark of judicial rationality, not treated as an administrative law 
pariah, as we will demonstrate. 
 
2.  The EPA’s Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
 The EPA’s cost-benefit was based upon a comparison between two 
states of the world: one in which the agency took no action to regulate 
asbestos, and one in which it regulated by banning a wide range of different 
products. For each of the twenty-seven products to be regulated, the EPA 
calculated the reduction in fatal cases of cancer among workers who would 
otherwise have come into contact with products made from asbestos.71 On 
                                                 
69 Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 363 n. 
272 (1999); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking 
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); David M. Driesen, Regulatory Reform: The New 
Lochnerism?, 36 ENVTL. L. 603 (2006); Robert B. Haemer, Reform of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act: Achieving Balance in the Regulation of Toxic Substances, 6 ENVTL. LAW. 99 
(1999); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response 
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997). But see Eric A. Posner, Controlling 
Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1137, 1195-96 (2001) (enumerating the many problems with the EPA’s cost-benefit 
analysis). 
70 McGarrity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking, supra note 69, at 546; see 
also McGarrity, Deossifying, supra note 69, at 1423 (describing the opinion as “virtually 
indistinguishable from the documents that OMB prepares in connection with its oversight 
of EPA rulemaking,” as if to highlight how out of place such an analysis was in a judicial 
opinion). 
71 EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,486. Among the many grounds on which the Fifth Circuit 
criticized the EPA was the fact that it only only calculated costs and benefits through the 
year 2000. Id. In addition, the fact that the EPA only evaluated the mortality risks of 
asbestos means that the agency left unquantified a variety of other regulatory benefits, 
including non-fatal diseases caused by asbestos (emphysema, bronchitis, or even non-fatal 
cancers), reduced medical costs, reduced asbestos exposure in the general population (as 
opposed to employees who worked with asbestos), and cancer cases that might occur after 
the year 2000. This continues a trend we have observed of agencies quantifying only 
mortality-related benefits and not morbidity-related ones. Masur & Posner, Against 
Feasibility Analysis, supra note. Extending the analysis to capture these overlooked costs 
and benefits would have ambiguous effects; we do not know whether the CBA would have 
appeared more or less favorable to the regulation had it been more comprehensive.  
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the cost side of the ledger, the agency quantified the costs to consumers of 
purchasing more expensive asbestos-free products and the costs to 
manufacturers (lost profits).72 
The EPA’s first misstep was its failure to consider any less stringent 
alternatives to a complete asbestos ban, such as permitting the use of 
asbestos so long as it was labeled with appropriate warnings,73 or permitting 
its use but requiring protective equipment, such as respirators, for anyone 
working with the substance.74 The agency did not conduct a CBA of any of 
these alternatives, and from the regulation it does not appear that it even 
considered them in any systematic way.75 
This oversight was significant for two reasons. First, the statute 
explicitly directs the agency to select the “least burdensome” type of 
regulation that would ameliorate the risks from asbestos. Without having 
examined the regulatory alternatives, the agency cannot establish that it has 
done so. This is the primary basis on which the court rejected the regulation, 
and it might have determined the outcome even had the agency made no 
other errors.76 Many commentators have criticized the Fifth Circuit for this 
aspect of its decision and argued that the statute does not in fact require the 
agency to choose the least burdensome mode of regulation, the plain 
language of the statute notwithstanding.77 We agree that it is asking a lot of 
an agency—too much, in all likelihood—to require it to select the optimal 
regulation, as opposed to choosing the best regulation from among a finite 
set of options or simply settling on a regulation that produces more benefits 
than costs. The problem here was that the EPA did not consider a single 
alternative in its CBA. It is difficult to see how the agency fulfilled its 
statutory mandate without considering even one alternative mode of 
regulation. 
Second, the EPA’s decision to ignore alternatives such as requiring 
workers to use protective equipment affected the CBA’s “zero regulation” 
baseline. In calculating the costs and benefits of regulating, the agency 
assumed that, in the absence of regulation, workers who came into contact 
with asbestos would not use available protective equipment. This had the 
                                                 
72 EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,468. It also did not quantify the costs of lost jobs for workers 
who were employed in asbestos-related industries, which we have similarly observed to be 
typical of administrative agencies. Masur & Posner, Unemployment and Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, supra note 18, at 593. 
73 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(3) (2016). 
74 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a)(5) (2016) (permitting the agency to regulate “any manner or method 
of commercial use of such substance or mixture”). 
75 EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,462. 
76 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1217. 




effect of maximizing the apparent benefits of complete regulation, as 
compared with the baseline of zero regulation and zero workplace safety 
protections.78 
 And yet despite the EPA’s having stacked the deck in its favor, the 
costs of banning many asbestos-related products well outweighed their 
benefits, even by the EPA’s own calculations. For instance, the EPA 
estimated that it would cost $128.03 million to eliminate asbestos pipe, but 
doing so would only save 4.38 lives, for a cost of $29.23 million per life 
saved.79 The EPA does not use or report a value of a statistical life (VSL) 
anywhere within the regulation. The Fifth Circuit did not focus on this 
oversight, but it is unquestionably an error—how can the agency know 
whether the benefits of the regulation exceed the costs without converting 
the two quantities into the same unit? Regardless, the $29.23 million figure 
is far greater than any value that the EPA has ever used. In 1984, five years 
before the asbestos regulation, the EPA used a VSL of $4.5 million;80 in 
1997, it used a value of $5.75 million;81 and the current EPA VSL is $7.4 
                                                 
78 EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,474. The Fifth Circuit declared that the agency had thus 
“artificially inflated” the benefits of the regulation. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 
1216-17. 
79 EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,484-85. As with many regulations, the benefits—fatal cases of 
cancer avoided—would only have been realized years into the future. The EPA reported its 
estimates of lives both undiscounted (that is, a discount rate of 0%) and discounted at 3%. 
Id. at 29,485. The Fifth Circuit criticized this sharply and argued that if the EPA discounted 
costs, it must discount benefits as well. Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1218. In turn, 
academic commentators have harshly criticized the court for requiring that the number of 
lives saved be discounted. This is a highly complex and technical issue, with no obvious 
resolution. See Richard Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 977–81 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein & 
Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and Intergenerational 
Equity, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 171 (2007). For our purposes, resolving this disagreement is 
unnecessary. Deciding whether or not to discount benefits affects the cost-benefit calculus 
with respect to several of the twenty-seven products at issue, but there are still multiple 
products that fail a cost-benefit test even under the most generous interpretation. Here and 
elsewhere within the text we report the EPA’s undiscounted estimate of the number of lives 
that would be saved in order to provide the agency with the greatest possible benefit of the 
doubt. 
80 EPA, Mortality Risk Valuation, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-
economics/mortality-risk-valuation. The EPA reports this value in 2001 dollars. We report 
it here undiscounted again in order to provide the EPA with the benefit of the doubt. 
81 EPA, Economic Analysis for the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Source Category: Pulp and Paper Production; Effluent Limitations 
Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards: Pulp, Paper, 
and Paperboard Category—Phase 1 (1997), at 8-12, Table 8-6. Here, the EPA utilized a 




million.82 If the EPA had used a VSL of $5.75 million, it would have found 
that the ban on asbestos pipe produced benefits of only $25.19 million, and 
thus costs that were more than $100 million greater than the benefits. 
Similarly, the EPA estimated that its ban on asbestos shingles would 
save 0.32 lives at a cost of $23.57 million, or $73.66 million per life.83 At a 
VSL of $5.75 million, this product ban would produce costs that exceed 
benefits by more than $20 million. The EPA also estimated that its ban on 
asbestos coatings (for roofs and other surfaces) would save 3.33 lives at a 
cost of $46.29 million, or $13.3 million per life.84 With the VSL set at $5.75 
million, this part of the regulation was expected to produce costs that 
exceeded benefits by roughly $27 million. It is difficult to imagine the 
modern EPA, which incorporates VSL figures into its cost-benefit analyses, 
making such mistakes.85 
 The Fifth Circuit, drawing upon case law from the D.C. Circuit and 
the Supreme Court, held that the statute’s requirement that a risk be 
“unreasonable” explicitly called for cost-benefit balancing: a risk was only 
“unreasonable” and thus subject to regulation if the benefits of eliminating 
that risk exceeded its costs.86 The court thus concluded that the EPA had 
acted outside of its statutory authority by regulating products that did not 
pose unreasonable harms. 
Academic commentators who are otherwise hostile to CBA have 
criticized the court on this point, arguing that it improperly substituted its 
judgment for the agency’s. As a matter of policy, that criticism is 
misplaced—the Fifth Circuit was right to reject the parts of the regulation 
that did not pass a cost-benefit test. As a matter of law, it is certainly 
possible to quarrel with the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of “unreasonable” 
even though that word is often understood in other legal contexts, such as 
tort law, to require balancing the benefits and costs of precautions. But this 
is unimportant to our ultimate point, which is the court’s evaluation of the 
EPA’s CBA. The Fifth Circuit may have been tougher on the EPA than the 
statute required, but it hardly lacked the capacity to check the agency’s 
work. 
 The EPA’s final mistake was its failure to account for the fact that 
substitute non-asbestos products might carry their own risks to health and 
                                                 
82 EPA, Mortality Risk Valuation, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-
economics/mortality-risk-valuation. The EPA reports this value in 2006 dollars. 
83 EPA, Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce 
Prohibition, 54 Fed. Reg. 29,460, 29,484-85 (July 12, 1989) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 
763). 
84 Id. 
85 See, e.g., EPA, supra note 81, at 3-22 (employing a VSL figure to calculate the benefits 
of regulating pulp and paper producers). 
86 Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d at 1222. 
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safety. If substitutes for asbestos will also lead to loss of life, those lives 
should be offset from the benefits (in lives saved) of the asbestos ban. Yet 
the EPA failed to perform this necessary step for several products where the 
substitutes presented non-trivial risks to life. For instance, the EPA had 
“credible evidence ‘that a ban on asbestos use in the aftermarket for brake 
systems designed for asbestos friction products will compromise the 
performance of braking systems designed for asbestos brakes’” yet failed to 
account for the possible additional lives lost if brakes failed.87 Similarly, the 
EPA acknowledged that PVC pipe, the most widely used substitute for 
asbestos pipe, also caused cancer among the workers who manufactured it, 
perhaps even to the same extent as asbestos pipe.88 Nonetheless, it 
maintained (against evidence) that this cancer threat was likely overstated 
and did not factor it into the CBA.89 Here, again, critics have faulted the 
Fifth Circuit for its “overly” searching review. But even on the EPA’s own 
terms, it makes no sense to replace one unreasonable risk with another. The 
agency was wrong to regulate without evaluating the full effects of its 
regulation, not merely the benefits of eliminating one type of product in 
isolation. 
 To be sure, many of the asbestos product bans would likely have 
produced benefits in excess of costs—though it is difficult to be certain 
without a full evaluation of the benefits and costs of substitutes. For 
instance, the agency found that the ban on asbestos brakes for new 
automobiles would save 19.68 lives at a cost of $12.97 million, or roughly 
$660,000 per life saved.90 On the whole, the EPA calculated that its 
regulation would save 202 lives at a cost of $458.89 million, or $2.27 
million per life saved.91 Nevertheless, the fact that some of the product bans 
were reasonable did not and should not insulate the others from review, 
particularly given that it was fully within the EPA’s control to decide which 
products to regulate. The agency originally considered regulating 37 
possible products and eventually selected 27 of them.92 It should have 
selected fewer. 
                                                 
87 Id. at 1225 (citing 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,494). 
88 EPA, 54 Fed. Reg. at 29,497. 
89 Asbestos; Manufacture, Importation, Processing, and Distribution in Commerce 
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3.  Lessons 
 
 Corrosion Proof Fittings does not support the argument of its critics 
that generalist courts lack the capacity to review the work of technocratic 
agencies. On most technical points, the court got it right and the agency got 
it wrong. The court did not second-guess the agency’s economic models or 
the peer-reviewed research it relied upon, nor should it have. It relied 
instead upon simple logic and even simpler arithmetic, which are hardly 
foreign to even the most generalist judges. No specialized training in 
science or economics was required. 
If the Fifth Circuit went too far, it was in demanding formal CBA 
where the law (as best understood in 1990) did not obviously require it. In 
this respect, the Fifth Circuit might have been prescient, as we will explain 
in Part III. But even if the court was not, these were errors of law, not errors 
in evaluating the agency’s CBA. In a similar vein, some commentators have 
criticized the Fifth Circuit’s choice of remedy, arguing (for instance) that 
the court should have remanded the regulation to the EPA but let it remain 
in force in the interim, rather than vacating it.93 The court did not have the 
authority to strike down some aspects of the regulation while letting others 
stand, as courts sometimes do with statutes. Here, it was all or nothing. 
Perhaps the court would have been better advised to allow the regulation to 
stand while the EPA improved it on remand. But the choice of remedy 
again has nothing to do with the court’s competence to review the EPA’s 
CBA, which is the issue that concerns us. On that score, the Fifth Circuit’s 
much-maligned opinion in Corrosion Proof Fittings is grounds for 
confidence. 
 
B.  Business Roundtable 
 
 1.  The Regulation, the Court Decision, and the Academic Response  
 
 Corporate voting takes place at shareholder meetings, but because 
few shareholders attend the meetings, they are allowed to vote “by proxy.” 
The corporation sends a proxy ballot to the mailing addresses of all 
shareholders. Shareholders who wish to vote fill out the ballot and mail it 
back to the corporation. (Proxy voting can also occur via the internet.) Their 
votes are then registered during the shareholder meeting. Because the 
corporation designs the proxy ballot (subject to various legal constraints, 
including disclosure requirements), the corporation can decide whose names 
                                                 
93 See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 34, at 56-57. 
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are placed on the ballot for director positions. Corporations typically 
include only the names of incumbents or replacements who are endorsed by 
the incumbents. When the SEC began considering the proxy access rule, 
corporations were not required to include the names of “dissidents” 
nominated by shareholders, and rarely did. In order to elect dissidents, 
shareholders who supported them were required to prepare their own proxy 
ballots and mail them directly to shareholders. This was an expensive and 
time-consuming process that only the largest and most sophisticated 
shareholders could afford. Critics of the system argued that that 
corporations should be required to give “proxy access” to shareholders, or 
some of them, so that dissident would be placed on the proxy ballot mailed 
by the corporation to shareholders.94 
 The SEC undertook notice-and comment rulemaking and ultimately 
issued Rule 14a-11, in 2010.95 The rule was intended to improve corporate 
governance, and hence the value of the corporate form, by reducing the cost 
of electing “dissident” directors who were not supported by the leaders of a 
corporation. The final rule provided that a corporation must include 
information about a shareholder nominee in the proxy materials and put the 
nominee’s name on the proxy ballot if the nominee is nominated by a 
shareholder or group of shareholders who have held at least 3% of the 
voting power of the corporation for at least three years. If more than one 
shareholder or group of shareholders is eligible, than only the person or 
group with the largest voting power may take advantage of the proxy access 
rule. Various other limits and procedural requirements were also imposed. 
 The D.C. Circuit struck down Rule 14a-11 in Business 
Roundtable.96 The legal bases for its holding were the Administrative 
Procedure Act, which bars “arbitrary and capricious” rulemaking, and the 
Exchange Act and the Investment Company Act of 1940, which require the 
SEC to take account of “efficiency, competition, and capital formation” 
when issuing a new rule. The Court interpreted these provisions as requiring 
the SEC to show that Rule 14a-11 passed a cost-benefit test, and held that 
the SEC’s CBA was defective. 
 The court found numerous errors in the SEC’s CBA. First, the SEC 
failed to “estimate and quantify” the costs that result when companies 
oppose shareholder nominees in election contests, and failed to state in the 
                                                 
94 See, e.g, Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access 
Database, 65 THE BUSINESS LAWYER 329 (2010); Bo Becker, Daniel Bergstresser & 
Guhan Subramanian, Does Shareholder Proxy Access Improve Firm Value? Evidence from 
the Business Roundtable’s Challenge, 56 J.L. & ECON. 127 (2013).  
95 SEC, Facilitator Shareholder Director Nominations, 75 Fed. Reg. 16,668, 56,670 (Sept. 
16, 2010) (codified at 17 CFR 240.14a-11) 
96 647 F.3d 1144, 1156 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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alternative that these costs could not be estimated.97 Second, the SEC relied 
on “insufficient empirical data” for its conclusion that Rule 14a-11 would, 
by increasing the likelihood that dissidents would sit on corporate boards, 
improve the performance of corporations. The studies on which the SEC 
relied provided only “mixed” support.98 Third, the SEC discounted the costs 
of the rule by improperly assuming that the board and management would 
not be distracted by election contests because they were required by state 
law to allow them in any event, ignoring the fact that Rule 14a-11 may 
make these battles more common.99 Fourth, the SEC disregarded the risk 
that Rule 14a-11 would enable “shareholders with special interests”—
unions and pension funds—to use their voting power to achieve goals 
unrelated to shareholder value, like higher wages.100 Fifth, the SEC failed to 
properly estimate the incremental effect of Rule 14a-11 on the number of 
election contests and frequency of nominations relative to the status quo.101 
Finally, the SEC ignored the special circumstances of investment 
companies, which are subject to independent regulatory requirements that 
may reduce the benefits of shareholder nominations.102  
 The academic response was swift and furious. Scholars argued that 
the court disregarded the law, which had never required the SEC to show 
that its regulations passed a formal CBA.103 Many earlier judicial opinions 
had deferred to the SEC on a range of issues—including its evaluation of 
empirical studies. Administrative law imposes numerous procedural 
requirements on agencies like the SEC—requirements that they give notice, 
that they explain their decisions, and so on—and the court did not identify a 
significant failure to comply with any of these requirements. Moreover, 
scholars argued that the court mishandled the studies—giving weight to a 
literature survey conducted by experts hired by the petitioners while 
                                                 
97 Id. at 1150. 
98 Id. at 1150-51.  
99 Id. at 1151. 
100 Id. at 1151-52.  
101 Id. at 1153-54. 
102 Id. at 1154. 
103 The critical literature on Business Roundtable is too large to cite. We counted 25 articles 
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Bus. Rev. 125 (2012). For a rare defense, see Garrett F. Bishop & Michael A. Coffee, A 
Tale of Two Commissions; A Compendium of the Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirements 
Faced by the SEC & CFTC, 32 REV. OF BANKING & FIN. L. 585 (2012-2013) 
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dismissing high-quality peer-reviewed articles that lent support to the SEC’s 
position.104 
 
2.  The CBA and Its Problems 
 
 The SEC reported a CBA in the materials accompanying the 
proposed rule, and then updated it in light of comments. The latter 
document, which we focus on, accompanies the final rule. The CBA is 
seriously deficient. It does not adequately quantify either the benefits or the 
costs of the rule. 
 In the CBA, the SEC identifies four categories of benefit: (1) 
facilitating shareholders’ ability to nominate and elect directors; (2) creating 
a “minimum uniform procedure” for voting; (3) “potentially” improving 
board and company performance; and (4) creating more informed voting. 
However, the only benefit the SEC quantifies is the cost savings for 
shareholders, who on average save $18,000 per election contest in avoided 
printing and postage costs.105 
 Moreover, as the SEC seems to acknowledge, the key question is not 
the (de minimis) postage and printing cost savings, but the effect of the rule 
on corporate performance. To evaluate this question, the SEC would need to 
quantify three key variables: the rule’s effect on the probability that 
shareholders will nominate dissidents; its effect on the probability that the 
dissidents will be elected; and the effect of the dissident’s occupation of a 
board seat on the corporation’s behavior and ultimately its profits. It 
quantifies none of these variables. 
 For the first, the SEC argues that the proxy rule increases the 
probability that dissidents will be nominated because the cost savings 
encourage shareholders to nominate directors in the first place.106 But while 
simple economics suggests that if the cost of nomination declines, the 
frequency of nomination will increase, the minimal cost savings mean that 
the change in frequency will also be minimal. For the rule to have beneficial 
effects, the dissident nominee must also be elected—and presumably that 
will occur less than 100% of the time because other shareholders may prefer 
to vote for management nominees. 
 With respect to the second, the SEC does not estimate the 
probability that dissident nominees will be elected. A typical large 
shareholder of a large public corporation will rarely own more than 5-7% of 
the firm. The shareholder will be outvoted unless it can convince other 
shareholders to join it. This probability might be small, even tiny. 
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 The third question is whether a corporation that includes a dissident 
on its board will make higher profits than a corporation that lacks such a 
dissident. An initial concern is that the dissident will always be outvoted by 
the incumbents, and will otherwise not exert much influence on corporate 
decisions. However, it is also possible that incumbent directors will work 
harder and display greater loyalty to shareholders because they fear the 
greater chance of being replaced by dissidents. The SEC cites academic 
papers that it says support this position, but the two major studies it relies 
on provide no real evidence in support. One study, by Cernich et al., claims 
that firms with hybrid boards outperform those that do not but does not 
include a statistical test of the data it relies on.107 The other, by Mulherin 
and Poulsen, is statistically rigorous but focused on a different question. 
The authors show that firms that face proxy contests gain more value than a 
control group of firms that do not, but their study does not test the relevant 
hypothesis that lowering the cost of proxy contests increases the value of 
corporations.108 Moreover because proxy contests are most likely to occur 
at the most poorly managed corporations, the positive effect they find 
reflects variation in management and so does not reflect the benefits (or 
costs) for firms with better management.109 In any event, the SEC does not 
estimate the effect of Rule 14a-11 on corporate performance; it merely says 
that it is positive. 
 The SEC examines three categories of potential costs: possible 
adverse effects on company performance; additional complexity; and the 
costs of preparing, printing, and mailing additional proxy materials. It 
acknowledges all of these possible costs but addresses only the third 
                                                 
107 Chris Cernich, Scott Fenn, Michael Anderson & Shirley Westcott, Effectiveness of 
Hybrid Boards (Proxy Governance Working Paper, Nov. 2009). 
108 Annette B. Poulsen & Harold J. Mulherin, Proxy Contests and Corporate Change: 
Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 279 (2013). 
109 As the SEC acknowledges, see Final Rule, note 921. The empirical literature on 
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Compare David Yermack, Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance, Annual Review 
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Empirical Evidence, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 365 (1996); John G. Matsusaka, Why Do Managers 
Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from No-Action Letter Decisions, HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 20, 
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category in quantitative terms. In a confusing passage, the SEC makes 
various estimates of the costs in time and money for companies (and in 
some cases, shareholders) to make relevant disclosures, evaluate proposals 
for their legal compliance, print and mail proxy materials, and fight against 
a shareholder nominee.110 However, in some cases it is unclear whether the 
SEC agreed with commentators’ estimates, and, in any event, it does not 
conclude with a formal aggregate estimate. 
 The SEC’s CBA was plainly inadequate. Because it did not include 
estimates of (quantified) aggregate costs and benefits, it did not provide a 
basis for the conclusion that the rule was efficient. The court properly struck 
down the rule on cost-benefit grounds. 
 What should the SEC have done? The major question is whether 
Rule 14a-11 would improve the value of corporations by more than the cost 
of compliance. On the benefit side, proxy access will improve the value of a 
corporation if, by improving corporate governance, it reduces the cost of 
capital. To evaluate the prospect for such improvement, two questions must 
be answered. First, how many firms—and what kind of firms—are likely to 
add dissident directors as a result of the proxy access rule? Second, to what 
extent will dissident directors affect the performance of a firm? 
 We suspect that the major obstacle to the rule is that it is implausible 
that, by reducing the cost of nominating a director by $18,000, the rule 
would produce more than a trivial likelihood that dissidents will be 
nominated and elected over the baseline. This amount of money is pocket 
change for shareholders who own 3% of a large firm. If they expect to gain 
financially from the election of a dissident, this amount of money will not 
show up on the radar screen. And if the increased likelihood of election of a 
dissident director is trivial, then the overall effect of the rule will be trivial 
as well. While the SEC cited a study that suggested that proxy contests (but 
not necessarily contests involving dissident nominees) increase firm value, 
it did not derive an estimate of this benefit for use as an input in the CBA of 
the proxy access rule.111 It matters to the CBA whether the improvement in 
corporate performance is great or small. Finally, the academic literature 
does not provide much support for the claim that large shareholders will 
cause firms to maximize profits rather than serve those shareholders’ 
private interests. Theory suggests that the shareholder has a weak incentive 
to maximize profits because most of the gains accrue to other 
shareholders.112 
 The best argument for the SEC is that the cost of complying with the 
rule is likely small. The only clearly identifiable costs are the printing and 
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mailing costs, which are very small. Indeed, they are likely to be zero or 
even negative in aggregate given that the rule transfers the burden from the 
shareholder to the corporation, which must merely augment the proxy 
materials, unlike the shareholder who must produce a separate mailing. 
 A more difficult question is how to estimate the cost of proxy battles 
that erupt when the corporation takes steps to fight the dissident nominee. 
We think that the best approach would have been to survey corporations 
and ask how much they have spent in these cases. Some commentators 
claimed costs as high as $14 million.113 While the SEC may have been 
justified in disregarding these numbers—which may have been 
unrepresentative or self-serving—it should have used a rigorous method to 
estimate costs. 
 Finally, the SEC should have addressed the argument that the proxy 
access rule would have been exploited by labor unions and pension plans to 
push through dissident directors uninterested in maximizing corporate 
profits. Here, we suspect that SEC was right to reject this argument, though 
it should have explained why. If, as we suggest above, the incremental 
savings of $18,000 will increase the probability of a dissident election by 
only a trivial amount, and if a dissident director will normally be outvoted, 
especially if it is true that he or she will try to transfer corporate resources to 
a favored constituency, then the harm done would be insignificant. But this 
argument implies the benefits of the rule are low as well, and so if it is 
sound, the rule would probably still fail a CBA. 
 
3.  Lessons 
 
 The reason that the court in Business Roundtable acted rightly in 
striking down the proxy access rule is not that the rule was obviously a bad 
one but that the SEC failed to supply an adequate CBA. The SEC’s CBA 
was inadequate because it did not calculate aggregate benefits and costs in 
quantified form. If the court had upheld the rule, the SEC would have been 
given no incentive to take CBA seriously. There is also strong evidence 
that, as a result of Business Roundtable, the SEC has significantly improved 
its CBAs.114 
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 The case would have been a great deal more difficult if the SEC had 
supplied estimates of the benefits and the costs derived from the studies that 
it cited. If it had conducted the surveys that we suggest, the petitioners 
would have attacked the quality of those surveys, and the court would have 
been required to evaluate them. We believe that the regulator should be 
given the benefit of the doubt when it interprets ambiguous survey results or 
must reconcile inconsistent findings of high-quality studies performed by 
academics or government researchers. It is possible, as some commentators 
argue, that the D.C. Circuit signaled that the SEC would be required to 
satisfy unrealistic standards, and, if so, it should be criticized. But because 
the SEC omitted the relevant cost and benefit estimates, the court’s ruling 
was correct, and we are left without information as to whether the court 
would have approved a higher quality CBA. 
 
C.   A Broader Perspective 
 
 The critics of Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable 
have much to say about law and precedent but do not come to grips with the 
real driver of the cases: that the CBAs of the EPA and SEC were shoddy. 
The courts were right to insist that if the EPA and SEC use CBA, then they 
should use it properly. The most significant errors of the EPA were its 
failure to monetize benefits, its insistence on banning products where the 
costs exceeded the benefits, and its failure to consider the costs of 
alternatives. In the case of the SEC, the failure to quantify the major 
benefits and costs of the regulation was decisive. As a result of the cases, 
both agencies have improved the quality of their CBAs.115 
 What accounts for the criticism of these cases? Both judicial 
opinions included some questionable reasoning. The Fifth Circuit seemed to 
imply that it would keep striking down EPA regulations until the EPA 
chose the single socially optimal regulation. We can see why commentators 
might worry that the EPA would never be able to satisfy this standard, and 
so if the Court were taken literally, regulation would become impossible or 
enormously difficult. However, the commentators read too much into the 
opinion. Once the Court satisfied itself that the CBA was inadequate, it was 
obviously tempted—perhaps reasonably so—to identify all the problems 
that it saw with the EPA’s reasoning so that the EPA would not repeat these 
mistakes the next time around. The Court did not say that any one of these 
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problems, taken on its own, would have been fatal to the regulation. 
Moreover, whether or not the Fifth Circuit erred in demanding too much of 
the agency, it demonstrated that it was capable of reviewing the EPA’s 
analysis.  
 The D.C. Circuit also said more than it needed to in Business 
Roundtable. Commentators leapt on a brief passage in which the Court 
appeared to rely on a report prepared by the petitioners’ experts while 
disregarding a peer-reviewed study.116 We agree that the Court should have 
given more attention to the academic study and less attention to the expert 
report. That said, the study did not support the regulation, while the expert 
report seems to have adequately summarized the literature. Given that the 
SEC did not quantify the relevant benefits and costs, the Court’s error was 
of no significance. 
 Commentators also argued that both courts disregarded precedents 
and misinterpreted statutes. Their argument boils down to the claim that the 
APA commands courts to be “deferential” and the two panels did not defer 
to the judgments of the regulators. The problem with this argument is that 
the APA makes no such command: it is entirely ambiguous. The Supreme 
Court and the lower courts have from time to time in dicta announced that 
courts should “defer” to the judgments of agencies, but this requirement has 
always been empty.117 It at most rules out the extreme end of the 
spectrum—the “high” or de novo level of review. In the cases themselves, 
the rulings are all over the place: sometimes courts strike down regulations 
based on seemingly minor disagreements with regulators, at other times 
they uphold regulations even after expressing doubts about major 
determinations by the regulators.118 We are firmly of the view that there is 
no way to derive a “rule” from this riot of case outcomes. But you can’t 
prove a negative. Maybe there is, and it is invisible or has not yet been 
discovered. 
 We think that CBA offers a way out. Courts really can scrutinize 
CBAs in a consistent way, just as they can scrutinize whether agencies 
follow procedural requirements like notice-and-comment. While judgment 
calls cannot be eliminated, they can be confined to a small portion of the 
decision space. The courts in Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business 
Roundtable were the first to understand this point. 
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III.  CBA AND THE LAW 
 
 We see Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable as 
harbingers rather than errors—harbingers of an era of enhanced judicial 
review of CBA. This conviction is fortified by developments in the 
Supreme Court. While the Supreme Court has not gone as far as the Fifth 
and D.C. Circuits, it has laid out a path in this direction. 
 
A.  CBA in the Supreme Court 
 
The story begins inauspiciously for CBA. In the 2001 case American 
Trucking v. Whitman,119 the Supreme Court addressed national ambient air 
quality standards promulgated by the EPA under Section 109 of the Clean 
Air Act.120 That statute directs the EPA to establish “ambient air quality 
standards the attainment and maintenance of which in the judgment of the 
Administrator, based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of 
safety, are requisite to protect the public health.”121 Trade groups 
challenging EPA standards for ozone and particulate matter argued that the 
agency should have taken costs into account when setting air quality 
standards.122 But the Court held that this part of the Clean Air Act did not 
permit the EPA to use CBA when regulating. Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, explained: “we find it implausible that Congress would give to the 
EPA through these modest words the power to determine whether 
implementation costs should moderate national air quality standards.”123 
“The language,” the Court said, “is absolute.”124 
Eight years later, however, the Court took a very different approach 
to CBA. Section 316(b) of the Clean Water Act, which governs thermal 
discharge and cooling water intake, directs the EPA administrator to 
promulgate regulations that “reflect the best technology available for 
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”125 The EPA balanced costs 
against benefits in determining the appropriate level of regulation.126 In 
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Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,127 the Court upheld the EPA regulation as a 
valid exercise of agency discretion under Chevron against challengers who 
argued that the agency should not have been permitted to use CBA.128 As 
the Court explained, 
 
“[B]est technology” may also describe the technology that most 
efficiently produces some good. In common parlance one could 
certainly use the phrase “best technology” to refer to that which 
produces a good at the lowest per-unit cost, even if it produces a 
lesser quantity of that good than other available technologies.129 
 
While the Court did not hold that CBA was required—an issue that was not 
before the Court—the holding was of great significance. Section 316(b) 
instructs the EPA to minimize adverse environmental impact without regard 
to costs or any other economic side constraint. Language which could have 
been interpreted to ban CBA—especially after Whitman—was instead 
interpreted as permissive. After Entergy, it seems that courts will not block 
an agency from using CBA, except perhaps if there is an explicit statutory 
prohibition.130 Because the White House requires most agencies to use CBA 
for most regulations where statutes allow them,131 Entergy means that CBA 
is more entrenched than ever. 
 Why did the Court undergo an about-face after Whitman? We do not 
know the answer, but a possible explanation is that it has realized that CBA 
is a routine rather than exceptional practice for agencies, and a good one at 
that. This recognition seems to be shared by all of the ideological positions 
on the court. The dissenters in Entergy said that another provision of the 
Clean Water Act—Section 301(b), which requires that the EPA mandate 
“the best practicable control technology”132 and directs the agency to 
consider “the total cost of application of technology in relation to the 
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved”133—required (rather than merely 
permitted) the agency to use CBA despite the ambiguity of the language.134 
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In 2015, the Supreme Court took one step further. Section 112 of the 
Clean Air Act, which governs regulation of certain hazardous air pollutants, 
instructs the EPA to regulate airborne emissions from power plants if it 
believes that regulation is “appropriate and necessary.”135 In the course of 
defending a regulation governing mercury emissions, the EPA argued that it 
need not take costs into account when deciding whether the regulation was 
“appropriate and necessary.”136 The Supreme Court rejected that view, 
Chevron notwithstanding. The Court held: 
 
The Agency must consider cost—including, most importantly, cost 
of compliance—before deciding whether regulation is appropriate 
and necessary. We need not and do not hold that the law 
unambiguously required the Agency, when making this preliminary 
estimate, to conduct a formal cost-benefit analysis in which each ad-
vantage and disadvantage is assigned a monetary value.137 
 
What does it mean to require an agency to take into account “cost” 
but not to conduct a “formal” CBA? It is not clear, but there is reason to 
believe that the Court thinks—or will soon think—that a formal CBA is 
required as well.138 The Court did not reach the question of whether a full 
CBA was mandated only because the EPA had taken the extreme position 
that it need not consider costs at all. In addition, the Court not only said that 
the agency must “consider” costs, but added that “[n]o regulation is 
‘appropriate’ if it does significantly more harm than good.”139 
Adrian Vermeule has suggested that the Court required only that 
agencies “consider” costs (in some fashion) and stopped short of requiring 
that they quantify or monetize those costs.140 But determining whether a 
regulation “does significantly more harm than good,” as the Court demands, 
necessarily requires comparing the magnitudes of costs and benefits.141 The 
                                                 
135 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A). 
136 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015). 
137 Id. at 2711. 
138 Contra Amy Sinden, A ‘Cost-Benefit State’? Reports of Its Birth Have Been Greatly 
Exaggerated, 49 ENVTL. L. REP. 10933 (2016). 
139 Id. at 2707. 
140 Adrian Vermeule, Does Michigan v. EPA Require Cost-Benefit Analysis?, Yale J. on 
Reg.: Notice & Comment (Feb. 6, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/does-michigan-v-epa-
require-cost-benefit-analysis-by-adrian-vermeule/. 
141 Vermeule also seems to suggest that the Court did not require that the EPA always 
consider costs, only that it consider costs any time it chose to consider benefits. Id. (“The 
Court’s main point, then, was simply that the agency would have to consider both benefits 
and costs, assuming it considered either.”). This argument would similarly seem to founder 
in the face of the Court’s insistence that “no regulation is ‘appropriate’ if it does 
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only way for an agency (or court) to compare costs and benefits is to 
quantify them and translate them into comparable units—in effect, to 
monetize them. Thus, even though it does not say so explicitly, the Supreme 
Court has for all practical purposes created a rule that agencies must 
quantify and monetize costs and benefits. 
Even if we are wrong and Vermeule is right, the other problem with 
his argument is that agencies (other than independent agencies) are required 
to conduct CBA—by the White House. And the White House normally 
requires that the CBA involve both quantified benefits and quantified 
costs.142 When a challenge to a regulation reaches a court, then as a 
practical matter—even if not as a legal matter if Vermeule is correct—the 
Court will be in a position to review the agency’s assessment of costs and 
benefits. That leaves the question whether a court will give the agency a 
pass if the agency says that costs or benefits exist without quantifying them. 
The logic of Michigan v. EPA suggests that the answer is no. After all, in 
that case the EPA did not deny that there would be costs, only that it need 
not quantify or consider them at the initial stage of regulation. This was 
unacceptable to the Court.  
In principle the EPA could comply with Michigan v. EPA by issuing 
a regulation that, it explicitly admits, generates benefits of $1 billion and 
costs of, say, $1.1 billion. But we expect that a regulator would be reluctant 
to make such an admission; indeed, that such an admission could be 
politically and legally fatal. It is not hard to imagine an oversight hearing 
where a member of Congress screams at the agency head: “you admit the 
regulation will cause more costs than benefits and you issued it anyway?” 
Moreover, a judge, no matter how inclined to be deferential, could strike 
down a regulation for the same reason. Agencies know this. In all of our 
research, we have found only a handful of regulatory impact analyses in 
which an agency admits that the costs of a regulation exceed the benefits, 
and in all of those instances the agency noted that it was obligated to 
promulgate the regulation by statute, regardless of cost.143 Otherwise, when 
agencies report quantified costs that exceed the benefits, the agencies 
always insist that unquantified benefits justify the regulation.144 This critical 
bit of wiggle room now appears to be foreclosed by the Supreme Court as a 
practical (if not legal) matter. 
It is important to note that the Court in Michigan v. EPA concluded 
that the EPA must balance costs and benefits in the face of highly 
                                                                                                                            
significantly more harm than good,” Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2711, which 
necessarily demands that the agency consider both benefits and harms. 
142 Executive Order 12,866; Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4. 




ambiguous statutory text. “Appropriate and necessary” is amenable to a 
broad range of statutory meanings, and it invokes cost-benefit balancing 
much less directly than many other regulatory statutes, such as the “best 
practicable control technology” provision from the Clean Water Act. For 
the Supreme Court to hold that a statute that nowhere mentions costs 
nonetheless requires consideration of costs—and requires that costs not 
significantly exceed benefits—represents a significant evolution from its 
position in Whitman v. American Trucking. There are a wide variety of 
regulatory statutes that use ambiguous language similar to “appropriate and 
necessary.” There are also many other statutes that use language that seems 
to invoke cost-benefit analysis even more directly. We survey and catalog 
some of these statutes in the Appendix. 
As in the case of Entergy, the Court’s enthusiasm for CBA crossed 
partisan lines. On the issue at the stake in the case, the dissenters agreed that 
the EPA must consider costs when regulating under § 112 of the EPA. The 
dissenters departed from the majority because they believed that the agency 
had in fact done so in the course of regulating.145 Writing for the four 
dissenters, Justice Kagan even took the opportunity to offer a ringing 
endorsement of the importance of considering costs: 
 
Cost is almost always a relevant—and usually, a highly important—
factor in regulation. Unless Congress provides otherwise, an agency 
acts unreasonably in establishing “a standard-setting process that 
ignore[s] economic considerations.” At a minimum, that is because 
such a process would “threaten[ ] to impose massive costs far in 
excess of any benefit.” And accounting for costs is particularly 
important “in an age of limited resources available to deal with 
grave environmental problems, where too much wasteful 
expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean considerably 
fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps 
more serious) problems.”146 
 
Justice Kagan’s dissent suggests a default rule: agencies must weigh costs 
and benefits, at least in some fashion, absent an explicit statement to the 
contrary.147 This position is not yet law; the Michigan v. EPA majority does 
                                                 
145 Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. at 2714 (Kagan, J., dissenting). Although we have 
criticized the EPA’s approach to the regulation, see Masur & Posner, Unquantified 
Benefits, supra note 15, at 131-33, we tend to agree with Justice Kagan on this point. 
However, it is immaterial to our broader argument regarding the Court’s endorsement of 
CBA. 
146 Id. at 2716-17 (internal citations omitted). 
147 See Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 11-12 
(describing Justice Kagan’s opinion in similar terms). 
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not comment on it one way or the other. But the fact that even the Michigan 
v. EPA dissenters—presumably the justices who are least favorably inclined 
toward CBA—are willing to make such a statement is an obvious indication 
of the degree to which the Court now favors CBA. 
 
B.  The Federal Common Law of the Administrative State 
 
If we are right that CBA is becoming a generic, judicially-imposed 
requirement for regulation, what is the source of law? We see three 
possibilities. 
 
The Organic Statutes. Entergy and Michigan v. EPA tie CBA (or 
consideration of costs, in the latter case) to the text of the regulatory statutes 
at issue. This raises the inference that if a general CBA mandate exists, as 
we have argued, then it must be because Congress has ordered agencies to 
use CBA in hundreds of regulatory statutes.  
If such a position were taken, then a CBA mandate would be nearly 
universal. Nearly all organic statutes—as far as we have been able to 
survey—use language that is at least as general as that in Michigan v. EPA, 
and a huge number of them use language that requires considerations of 
cost, like the statute in Entergy. We provide numerous examples, with the 
accompanying language, in the Appendix. 
Still, any claim that Congress intended for agencies to use CBA 
across the board is a fiction. Many statues, such as the “appropriate and 
necessary” provision at issue in Michigan v. EPA, do not mention CBA; the 
general language they use is best interpreted as exhortation to the agency 
that it take seriously the risks that they are required to regulate, not that it 
regulate those risks in any particular way. 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act. Section 706 of the APA 
authorizes courts to strike down regulations that are “arbitrary and 
capricious.”148 Most scholars think that this level of review is highly 
deferential, based on the language itself, the practical limitations on 
generalist review of expert agencies, and the case law.149 By contrast, Cass 
                                                 
148 Id. at 4 (“[W]henever the governing statute authorizes an agency to quantify costs and 
benefits and to weigh them against each other, its failure to do so requires a non-arbitrary 
justification.”). 
149 Gersen & Vermeule, supra note 30 (arguing that arbitrary and capricious review has 
traditionally been lax). 
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Sunstein interprets this provision to require agencies to conduct CBA absent 
explicit statutory language to the contrary.150 
Sunstein’s argument would make sense of a general trend in the case 
law that transcends the particular statutes under which agencies regulate. 
The APA applies to all agency regulation; if the APA requires CBA, then 
all agencies must conduct CBA. Sunstein also thinks the cases—including 
Michigan v. EPA—support his view.151 
The problem is that none of the opinions in Michigan v. EPA 
mentions the APA, or even uses the words “arbitrary” or “capricious.” 
Entergy similarly lacks even a single mention of the APA, or a single 
appearance of the words “arbitrary” or “capricious.” Even Whitman v. 
American Trucking mentions the APA only in relation to whether the 
agency action in that case is final and reviewable. There is no mention of 
section 706, and the words “arbitrary” or “capricious” do not appear.152 It is 
of course possible to construct a reasonable argument that it would be 
arbitrary and capricious to promulgate a regulation that does not pass a cost-
benefit test.153 But it is hard to see the APA as the source of the judicial 
momentum behind CBA without so much as a single mention of the statute. 
Sunstein places significant weight on Justice Kagan’s dissent in 
Michigan v. EPA, which we described above. He observes that Justice 
Kagan’s position on CBA does not appear tethered to the Clean Air Act or 
any other regulatory statute—Kagan is making broad claims about the role 
of CBA in administrative regulation more generally.154 Sunstein then argues 
that this background principle must derive from the APA.155 But, like the 
author of the majority opinion, Justice Kagan does not cite the APA or 
                                                 
150 Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 2 
(“Whenever an agency fails to calculate costs and benefits and to show that the latter 
justify the former, a litigant might contend that it has acted arbitrarily.”); Cass R. Sunstein 
& Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Administrative Law, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 393, 440-42 
(“Indeed, it would generally seem arbitrary for an agency to issue a rule that has net costs 
(or no net benefits), at least unless a statute requires it to do so.”) (2015); SUNSTEIN, supra 
note 34, at 54-57. 
151 Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 11 (“In an 
important decision involving mercury regulation, all nine members of the Supreme Court 
seemed to converge on a simple principle: Under the APA, it is arbitrary for an agency to 
refuse to consider costs.”).  
152 In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the Fifth Circuit was at pains to explain that APA § 706 did 
not even apply to that case because Congress had mandated a different standard of review 
under the Toxic Substances Control Act. 947 F.2d at 1213-1214. Among the critical cases 
we discuss, only Business Roundtable mentions the APA, and there it is largely boilerplate 
recitation. Business Roundtable, 647 F.3d at 1148. 
153 Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 10-15. 
154 Id. at 12. 
155 Id. at 11-12. 
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mention the words arbitrary and capricious. Instead, she cites prior Supreme 
Court opinions, particularly Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Entergy, that 
also do not cite or mention the APA. There is no textual hook that connects 
these cases to the APA. 
 
 Federal Common Law. While courts like to tie their decisions to 
statutes, we think a better explanation of the development of CBA is as a 
kind of (federal) common law. The courts have awoken to the value of CBA 
and have increasingly mandated it because they believe that CBA should 
play a role in regulation. Seen in this perspective, we can reframe 
Sunstein’s APA argument by interpreting the APA as a general 
authorization to courts to develop a common law of the administrative state, 
just as the Sherman Act is today understood as an authorization of courts to 
develop a common law of antitrust.156 The two statutes are equally 
ambiguous: they all but insist that courts develop their own standards.157 
Just as the courts groped around blindly for decades before settling on 
economic principles for guiding antitrust litigation, so have they finally, 
after much meandering, begun to settle on CBA for regulatory review. 
Why? It seems likely that courts have come to recognize that the technical 
advantages of CBA make it a good practice, not much different from 
keeping records, announcing deadlines, using data rather than anecdotes, 
using science rather than astrology, explaining decisions, and listening to 
criticism. The White House’s support for CBA over many decades and the 
increasing sophistication of agencies’ CBAs have probably also played a 
role.158 
 Taking a wide view and relying on hindsight, one can see CBA as 
the second stage of the rationalization of American government. The first 
stage was the New Deal, which transferred authority from state legislatures 
and common-law courts to federal agencies. The agencies were staffed with 
                                                 
156 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2007) 
(“From the beginning the Court has treated the Sherman Act as a common-law statute.”).  
157 Adrian Vermeule has argued that courts cannot require cost-benefit analysis without a 
direct statutory mandate because doing so would run afoul of Vermont Yankee. Sunstein & 
Vermeule, supra note 150; Vermeule, , supra note 140. Vermont Yankee prohibits courts 
from devising procedural requirements beyond those outlined in the APA. But as we have 
argued, it is possible to view the APA itself as having authorized courts to create federal 
administrative common law, including requiring CBA. Cass Sunstein has made a similar 
point. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Arbitrariness Review, supra note 11, at 12. Yet 
even if this is wrong, and Vermeule’s reading is correct, the Supreme Court does not seem 
to have noticed. The Supreme Court is well on its way to requiring that agencies balance 
costs and benefits absent explicit statutory language to the contrary. If Vermont Yankee 
prohibits this, the Court does not appear to care. 
158 See Jonathan S. Masur, CBA at the PTO, 65 Duke L.J. 1701, 1705 (2016) (noting that 
every president from Reagan to Obama has supported CBA). 
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experts and given broad authority to regulate in the public interest. But from 
an early stage the New Deal was opposed by people who feared that federal 
regulators would abuse their discretion. Congress grappled with this 
problem by imposing procedural requirements on agencies and providing 
for an ambiguous level of judicial review in the APA.159 By the 1970s, 
however, it was clear that the system was unsustainable. Much regulation 
turned out to be ill-conceived and ideologically motivated. A bipartisan 
deregulatory movement corrected many of the worst errors, but by the 
1980s the deregulatory movement splintered into a faction that sought to 
turn the clock back to 1932 and a faction that sought technocratic 
rationalization. CBA was born amid these controversies, and was initially 
considered a “conservative” decision-procedure because of its association 
with President Reagan. Its survival across Democratic administrations has 
put that myth to rest. 
 The natural interpretation of this legal trajectory is that the three 
branches of government are converging on the view that regulatory agencies 
should normally comply with CBA. As a technical matter, the courts have 
mostly relied on organic statutes rather than on the APA. At the level of 
legal theory, we think it best to describe this development as one of federal 





 Corrosion Proof Fittings and Business Roundtable have long been 
criticized as egregious examples of judicial overreaching into areas of 
agency discretion. But the courts should be celebrated for their insight 
rather than condemned for their hubris. As the Supreme Court has gradually 
come to recognize, regulatory agencies should use CBA and courts are 
capable of forcing them to. CBA is a decision procedure: requiring agencies 
to comply with this procedure is no more difficult than forcing them to 
comply with the procedural elements of the APA. And while CBA also 
requires substantive judgments—estimates of valuations—that are more 
difficult for courts to review, courts can nonetheless contribute to 
administrative rationality by correcting valuation errors that regulatory 
agencies frequently commit and demanding that agencies offer explanations 
for their valuations that go beyond boilerplate. This point applies just as 
                                                 
159 It may also have been intended to empower judges appointed by Democratic presidents 
to block deregulation by administrators appointed by Republican presidents, as argued by 
Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246 (1987), but this amounts 
to the same thing. 
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strongly to deregulation as to regulation. If a president seeks to impose new 
environmental or safety regulations, he must demonstrate that they will 
create greater benefits than costs. And if a president wishes to dismantle 




Statutes that explicitly reference costs 
Statute Section Text 
America Invents Act 35 U.S.C. § 316(b) “shall consider the effect of any such 
regulation on the economy” 
America Invents Act 125 Stat. 284 § 10(e)(1)(B) “the specific rationale and purpose for the 
proposal, including the possible 
expectations or benefits resulting from the 
proposed change.” 
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) “require the maximum degree of reduction 
in emissions of the hazardous air pollutants 
. . . that the Administrator, taking into 
consideration the cost of achieving such 
emission reduction . . . determines is 
achievable.” 
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7475(a)(4), 
42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) 
“best available control technology” defined 
as “the maximum degree of reduction . . . 
which the [EPA] . . . taking into account 
energy, environmental, and economic 
impacts and other costs, determines is 
achievable.” 
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) “best system of emission reduction which 
(taking into account the cost of achieving 
such reduction . . .) the Administrator 
determines has been adequately 
demonstrated”160 
Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1), 
33 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) 
“best available demonstrated control 
technology” . . . “tak[ing] into 
consideration the cost of achieving such 
effluent reduction” 
Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 
1311(b)(2)(A)(i), 
33 U.S.C. § 
1311(b)(2)(A)(i) 
“best available technology economically 
achievable” while considering “the cost of 
achieving such effluent reduction.” 
Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E), 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) 
“best conventional pollutant control 
technology” considering “the 
reasonableness of the relationship between 
the costs of attaining a reduction in 
effluents and the effluent reduction benefits 
derived.” 
                                                 
160 This is the section of the statute under which the Obama Administration promulgated the Clean Power Plan, 
which regulates the emission of greenhouse gases, https://www.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/what-epa-doing, and it is 




Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A), 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) 
“best practicable control technology” 
considering “the total cost of application of 
technology in relation to the effluent 
reduction benefits to be achieved”161 
Commodity 
Exchange Act 
7 U.S.C. § 19(a) “the Commission shall consider the costs 




15 U.S.C §2058(f) 
 
“A description of the potential benefits and 
potential costs of the rule, including costs 
and benefits that cannot be quantified in 
monetary terms, and the identification of 
those likely to receive the benefits and bear 
the costs” 
Dodd-Frank Act 12 U.S.C. §5512(b)(2) “In prescribing a rule . . . the Bureau shall 
consider the potential benefits and costs to 
consumers and covered persons” 
Investment Advisers 
Act 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) 
 
“the Commission shall also consider . . . 
whether the action will promote efficiency, 
competition, and capital formation” 
Prison Rape 
Elimination Act of 
2003 
 
42 U.S.C. § 15607(a)(1)-
(3) 
 
“The Attorney General shall not establish a 
national standard under this section that 
would impose substantial additional costs 
compared to the costs presently expended 






12 U.S.C. §4802(a) “each Federal banking agency shall 
consider . . . any administrative burdens 
that such regulations would place on 
depository institutions . . . and the benefits 
of such regulations” 
Statutes with ambiguous language 
Statute Section Text 
Agricultural 
Marketing Act 
7 U.S.C. § 1624(b) “The Secretary of Agriculture shall 
promulgate such orders, rules, and 
regulations as he deems necessary”  
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) “requisite to protect the public health”162 
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) “appropriate and necessary”163 
Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c)(1) “reasonably available control technology” 
FAA Extension, 
Safety, and Security 
Act 
49 U.S.C. § 106(f)(3)(A)  “the Administrator is authorized to issue, 
rescind, and revise such regulations as are 
necessary” 
                                                 
161 This is the section of the Clean Water Act that the dissenting justices in Entergy—Stevens, Souter, and 
Ginsburg—agreed “specified that the EPA was to conduct a cost-benefit analysis.” Entergy, 556 U.S. at 241-43 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
162 This is the statutory section at issue in Whitman v. American Trucking. 





15 U.S.C. §1681s “necessary or appropriate”  
Federal Food, Drug, 
and Cosmetic Act 
 
21 U.S.C. § 360j(e) 
 
“shall bear such appropriate statements of 
the restrictions required  . . . as the 
Secretary may in such regulation prescribe” 
Food Safety 
Modernization Act 
21 U.S.C § 350g(o) 
 
“those risk-based, reasonably appropriate 
procedures, practices, and processes . . . to 
significantly minimize or prevent the 
hazards identified”  
Healthy, Hunger-
Free Kids Act 
42 U.S.C. § 1779(a) “shall prescribe such regulations as the 




12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(2) “necessary or appropriate” 
Investment Advisers 
Act 
15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(c) “necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest [including] whether the action will 




16 U.S.C. § 1373(a)  “necessary and appropriate” 
Occupational Safety 
and Health Act 
29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) “which most adequately assure[], to the 
extent feasible . . . that no employee will 
suffer material impairment of health” and 
are “reasonably necessary or appropriate to 
provide safe or healthful employment and 
places of employment” 
Privacy Act 15 U.S.C. §6801(b) “shall establish appropriate standards”  
Secure Fence Act 120 Stat. 2638 “necessary and appropriate”165 
Securities Exchange 
of 1934 
15 U.S.C. §78w(a)(2) 
 
“shall not adopt any such rule or regulation 
which would impose a burden on 
competition not necessary or appropriate” 
Telecommunications 
Act of 1996 
47 U.S.C. §1302(a) “in a manner consistent with the public 
interest” 
Statutes that reference maximal regulation  
Statute Section Text 
Clean Water Act 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) “best technology available for minimizing 
adverse environmental impact”166 
Federal Mine Health 
and Safety Act 
30 U.S.C. § 811(a)(6)(A) “standards which most adequately assure 
on the basis of the best available evidence 
that no miner will suffer material 
impairment” 
                                                 
164 This is the statutory section at issue in Business Roundtable. 
165 This is the statutory section under which President Trump proposes to build a wall at the Mexican border. 
Executive Order: Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2017/01/25/executive-order-border-security-and-immigration-enforcement-improvements. 






30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(24) “minimize disturbances and adverse 
impacts” of surface mining “to the extent 
possible using the best technology 
currently available” 
 
 
